Giving of Oneself
Rabbi Shemuel Eliyahu, chief rabbi of Tzefat and son of former Rishon le-Tziyyon (Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Israel) R. Mordechai Eliyahu, gave a rather interesting shiur at the HODS conference last week (November 16, 2006). I would like to share a brief summary of what he spoke about.
R. Eliyahu discussed the issue of whether one person may place himself into a potentially dangerous situation (safek sakkanah) to save his fellow from an absolute danger / risk to life (vadai sakkanah). This question has been discussed extensively by the posekim (a modern example was the question of the permissibility of kidney donation) and the general consensus is that while a person is certainly not obligated to enter such a safek sakkanah situation, one may nonetheless choose to do so.
This week in particular, it is appropriate to note that the Tzitz Eliezer thought that a person is forbidden to undertake a safek sakkanah to save his fellow (9:45, 10:25:7, 13:100-101 [regarding war]). R. Eliyahu assumed the majority position and did not refer to R. Waldenburg's opinion. Hopefully, the Tzitz Eliezer's position will be the subject of a future post.
In all of the cases discussed by the posekim, the person in question wanted to know if he must / should / should not undertake a safek sakkanah to save his fellow. The danger to the questioner is uncertain. R. Eliyahu posited that we could expand this idea to cases where a person could voluntarily undertake a vadai sakkanah – meaning death – to save his fellow from death.
R. Eliyahu cited the story of Pappus and Lulyanus (Taanit 18b) who gave themselves up to the Roman government – vadai sakkanah (death) – to save the citizens of Lod from certain death. R. Eliyahu argued that all of the sources that seem to say that one may not sacrifice one life to save another – all refer to cases where an outside force is compelling the taking of the life – meaning that no third party can choose one life over another – ein dohin nefesh mipnei nefesh (Sanhedrin 72b). However, if a person would voluntarily offer his own life, like Pappus and Lulyanus – such an act is worthy and such a person is considered holy. [R. Eliyahu limited this position to allow a person to voluntarily forgo hayyei sha'ah only and not more. This was a sub topic of the shiur and will not be addressed here.]
The practical ramifications of this involve a gossess (moribund patient) who previously agreed that were he to become a gossess, he willingly forgoes the small amount of time left in his life so that his organs may be used to save another person (removing the organs results in certain and immediate death). R. Eliyahu argued that since such a patient is a volunteer, he may risk a vadai sakkanah (death) to save another person. He argued this position regardless of how one views brain death – even the position that assumes that a brain dead patient is fully alive, he argued, would agree that such volunteerism is permitted (and possibly praiseworthy).
This is a novel and dare I say, radical position, that I do not believe has received much attention by the medical halakhic community.